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Employment Discrimination Cases in the 1989
Term: The Limited Impact Upon Civil
Rights Litigation
Paul Sprenger*
I was asked to speak about how plaintiffs' lawyers will coun-
sel potential plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases since
the 1989 Supreme Court term. Although we try cases much differ-
ently today than we did ten years ago, our methods do not differ
significantly from last year. In short, with two significant excep-
tions, the Supreme Court decisions of the Spring 1989 term
changed little in how plaintiffs' attorneys assess employment dis-
crimination cases.
Determining whether or not a particular client ought to sue,
and how to sue, requires a good deal of care. Good plaintiffs' law-
yers considering taking on a large corporation about its employ-
ment practices have to anticipate what the courts are going to do.
Before you invest thousands of hours and hundreds of thousands
of dollars prosecuting a case against a large corporation or a simi-
lar institution, you must assess the chances of winning. Plaintiffs'
employment litigators must make conservative assessments in this
regard. For example, you ought to know what the various district
and appeals courts have said before the 1989 Supreme Court cases
were decided. There certainly were divisions among the districts
as to what the law was, otherwise there would not have been
Supreme Court decisions on the issues. What the Supreme Court
did was resolve splits among the circuits. That is, the Supreme
Court decides cases primarily when there is a division of authority.
Therefore it is important to understand the split among the fed-
eral circuit courts and to base your case on a theory that is as unas-
sailable as possible. That does not mean you cannot represent a
potential plaintiff who has a less than perfect case, but you must
be able to structure your case in a way such that the legal theory is
backed by the authority in your circuit, or hopefully the majority
* Paul Sprenger is a partner with the Minneapolis and Washington D.C.
based law firm of Sprenger and Lang. He received his B.B.A. in 1962 and his J.D.
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of the courts. That is, and always has been, the central part of as-
sessing a case and counseling your client at the beginning.
In the area of employment discrimination litigation this pro-
cess has been affected by two 1989 cases: Martin v. Wilks,' and
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union.2 What the Supreme Court an-
nounced in Patterson surprised almost everyone, plaintiffs, defend-
ants, law professors, and most district trial judges. In Patterson,
the Supreme Court rejected the virtually unanimous position of
the federal district trial courts that Blacks could recover in em-
ployment situations for humiliation, pain, and suffering. Basically,
the court said that there is no longer any right under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981,3 part of a nineteenth century civil rights act, for Blacks to
collect damages for pain and suffering.
To illustrate: I received a phone call two weeks after the Pat-
terson decision from a black man in Texas who had been employed
as a telemarketer for a large corporation. The corporation hires
Blacks primarily because that helps it get into the black communi-
ties to sell its products. The man who called me found, after he
was hired by the telemarketing company, that his boss was a white
man who carried a bullwhip around. While the boss did not physi-
cally abuse the telemarketers, he intimidated them by snapping
his bullwhip, calling them racist names, and by being verbally abu-
sive. This was too much for my prospective client, and after sev-
eral months of this abuse, he had a breakdown and ended up
spending six weeks in the hospital. He asked me for advice. A
year ago, that would have been perhaps a million dollar recovery
and I would have taken the case. Today all I was able to tell him
was that there may be some state law claims in Texas we could
pursue, but the most that the federal law would offer him is a
right to tell this bully to put his bullwhip away. That really exem-
plifies a tremendous change in assessing that individual's case, and
to some extent, all class and race discrimination litigation. To me,
it is the most radical and astounding effect that the Supreme
Court had in this area.
The other Supreme Court decision that requires a different
counseling approach to potential plaintiffs is the Birmingham
firefighters case, Martin v. Wilks. This decision requires the
plaintiff to join as defendants not only all of the unions that repre-
sent employees of a defendant employer but also all of their non-
union employees as well. The case rests on the premise that you
1. 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989).
2. 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982).
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cannot bind someone who is not a party to the litigation, and the
only way to bind employees who are not members of the class is to
join their unions as defendants in the case. This is obviously more
troublesome if you want to get a binding judgment against non-
class member employees who are not represented by a union. I
think this is a procedural problem that can be cured, but I want to
point out that it is important to anticipate the issue when you are
assessing a case. I have made a practice of joining the unions since
1976, when the chief judge in the district of Minnesota ordered me
to join the unions in the 3M sex discrimination litigation. The fact
that the Supreme Court decided this term that you must join the
unions is not really a surprise. Furthermore, it doesn't require any
different approach. It is one of those things that most plaintiffs'
lawyers should have anticipated. The prudent approach before
Martin v. Wilks was to join the unions, so a conservative opinion
from the Rehnquist court would not be a shock, and would not
throw any of your cases out of court.
The Martin v. Wilks decision can be easily accomodated this
way. Not so Patterson, which in my opinion is a disastrous result
for a lot of Blacks in this country, in that they can no longer col-
lect damages for pain and suffering. In fact, they cannot collect
any such damages at all. If you believe, as I do, in the deterrent
effect of damages, you can see why I consider Patterson such a se-
rious setback for civil rights. What the Supreme Court did was to
put Blacks in the same place that women are in under federal law.
Women have never been able to collect damages under fed-
eral law for pain and suffering, humiliation, or for serious emo-
tional injury due to sexual harrassment. In contrast, Blacks have
been entitled to recover for such injuries. All harassment victims
should have been put on the same footing long ago, but the
Supreme Court went the wrong way. Every week I get five to ten
requests from women who are being emotionally abused in the
work place, and who have very strong claims of pain, suffering and
humiliation. But, under federal law, they cannot collect for sexual
harrassment. They may be able to stop it, by getting an order re-
quiring the employer to to do various things in the work place to
prevent sexual harrassment such as investigative and reporting
procedures, but they cannot get damages. They cannot be "made
whole." For example, I tried a sexual harrassment case against
the General Electric Company last year in the eastern district of
Virginia. My client had been harrassed, solicited, and assaulted by
her supervisor. The workplace environment was permeated by
sexual harassment. The supervisor had had coercive sexual rela-
tions with two other employees - often in the office itself. As a
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result of this harassment, my client attempted suicide and spent
six weeks in the hospital. The judge, who ruled in our favor on
the harrassment issue, said yes indeed, GE was responsible and
should have prevented the sexual harassment, and GE had to com-
mit to a policy and a major training program to see that it did not
happen again. Although the judge ruled that GE was responsible,
my client collected only one dollar. Unfortunately, Virginia is one
of the most conservative states in the country regarding employ-
ment matters, and has no state anti-discrimination law to protect
women or minorities in the workplace. So our client ended up
with little more than the gratification that she brought this prob-
lem to the public's attention, forced GE to change its practices, and
hopefully protected other women. But she got no monetary com-
pensation for what she endured. Patterson places Blacks and
other minorities in the same boat.
Many people have said that Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio,4 is a far reaching decision that is going to change how we
look at the world and how employment discrimination cases are
tried. I disagree. I say that knowing that some very well respected
academicians disagree. However, the truth is that Wards Cove is
one of those decisions that a plaintiffs' trial lawyer should have an-
ticipated a long time ago. You have to remember that Wards Cove
was tried in Alaska fifteen years ago. As a matter of fact, I tried a
class action case in 1986 with five months of daily in-court trial
time, most of which was devoted to a statistical presentation. That
statistical presentation in 1986 was very refined and it went far
and beyond anything that could be required in Wards Cove. Each
particular employment practice was isolated and statistical dispari-
ties were shown with respect to each of them. In fact, everyone in
the courtroom got tired of it, and it does get to be very boring
stuff, because of the necessary detail. To keep people awake you
do things like intersperse anecdotal witnesses as you go along to
bring the numbers to life a little. Anyway, given my experience,
Wards Cove does not change anything in my approach to the sta-
tistical side of a discrimination case. I saw it coming years ago.
I tried employment cases in 1974, and in those days we did
not have any direction from the Supreme Court like Hazelwood
School District v. United States,5 which came along in 1977, as to
what the statistical standards of discriminatory impact were. It was
a new approach then and attorneys were asking: "How do I do
this?" Some attorneys in 1974 in Alaska simply looked at the
4. 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989).
5. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
[Vol. 8:411
1990] EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION IN THE 1989 TERM 415
workforce and decided that because the workforce was primarily
Alaska Natives, then the pipefitters ought also to be primarily
Alaska Natives. All Justice White did was point out what to me
was perfectly obvious, and what the Supreme Court itself said in
1977, that you cannot compare pipefitters to the general popula-
tion, you must compare pipefitters on the job with qualified pipe-
fitters in the general population. That is, you must compare apples
to apples, not apples to an undifferentiated mass of fruits and veg-
etables. My guess is that only a small fraction of qualified journey-
men pipefitters in the state of Alaska are Alaska Natives. Anyone
familiar with statistical presentations at the trial level could have
looked at those factual records and said this case was a loser. For
this reason, I don't think Wards Cove changes anything about the
way I would handle a statistical case.
The other, more confounding problem, with Wards Cove was
the "business necessity" language in it. The language is convo-
luted, and while some people may purport to explain to you what
it means, I'm not sure its author could. The main reason I think
that it is not that consequential, once future cases straighten out
the meaning, is that in the several hundred employment discrimia-
tion cases that I have dealt with, business necessity has been raised
only on one occassion. It is difficult to find a legitimate business
necessity to justify discrimination. For example, consider the 3M
cases. These were brought in the early seventies and were among
the first class actions in the district of Minnesota, and, as far as I
know, in the Eighth Circuit. 3M tried to say that it hired women
into the lower paying jobs because women were weak and could
not lift things. If you presented that as a business necessity de-
fense, to anybody, you would be laughed out of court. That is ex-
actly how Judge Alsop, now the chief judge in this district, reacted
to 3M's business necessity defense. He kicked out the defense on
the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment even under the more
difficult standards of 1973.
So, as a practical matter, I do not think that Wards Cove
means much. I know, of course, that whenever you get an opinion
like this from the Supreme Court, a lot of people immediately
write articles, largely funded by the business round table or the
folks to whom this decision matters, which will support the propo-
sition that the decision ought to be presented to the courts as a
very significant defeat for civil rights plaintiffs. It is a question to
debate, perhaps, but it is not in any way as important to plaintiffs'
attorneys as what the Court did in Patterson.
Contrary to popular wisdom, there actually were some good
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developments arising out of recent Supreme Court decisions. For
instance, in Texas State Teachers Association v. Garland Independ-
ent School District,6 the Court held that a plaintiff's lawyer need
only prevail on some meaningful part of the litigation in order to
collect a reasonable fee for the entire litigation. Since fees are a
relevant part of case assessment to any civil rights advocate who
wants to stay in business, this was a significant development.
Before Texas State Teachers, employers argued, sometimes success-
fully, that plaintiff's counsel could only get paid piecemeal for the
issues or motions they won. If the plaintiff lost on some other mo-
tion it sometimes had to subtract that time from its fee petition.
The Supreme Court recognized, however, that in order to be
an effective plaintiff's advocate, an attorney must argue some posi-
tions which may be at the cutting edge. Consequently, it held that
successful plaintiffs are entitled to a reasonable fee in cases stem-
ming from claims arising from a common core of facts and involv-
ing related legal theories. Texas State Teachers is therefore a very
significant decision and one that is played down by defense counsel
and is much ignored by writers in the area, because fees are not
really that important to people writing law review articles. As a
practical matter, however, it is an important decision. It will en-
courage civil rights plaintiffs' attorneys to take on cases they
otherwise could not.
The most important, positive development for civil rights
plaintiffs from the Supreme Court last term was Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins.7 Justice Brennan wrote his opinion very well, and he
knew exactly what he was doing. In my view, he significantly
changed the burden of proof in employment discrimination cases.
This is very significant, because in the courtroom success often de-
pends upon the burden you have to carry. Price Waterhouse, an
accounting firm, had rejected a woman for partnership. Some of
the partners who voted against her did so because they did not
think she acted like a woman. They believed she was too aggres-
sive and masculine, and that she did not dress right. In other
words, they had sex-stereotyped her. In addition, her job perform-
ance was questioned, not an unusual issue when someone is being
admitted to partnership in an accounting firm. So there were ap-
parently two motives involved in voting her down. The Supreme
Court said two new and important things in the Price Waterhouse
case. First, it said sex-stereotyping of that nature violates Title
VII. Second, and more importantly, it said that the employer has
6. 109 S.Ct. 1486 (1989).
7. 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989).
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the burden of proving a negative. That is, the employer in this
kind of a situation has to prove that, in the absence of the discrimi-
nating motives or factors, it would have reached the same result.
This decision represents a return to where we were when try-
ing these cases back before Texas Department of Community Af-
fairs v. Burdine.8 Burdine established the principle that all an
employer had to do to shift the burden back to the plaintiff was to
articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatary reason for its conduct.
Justice Brennan brought the law right back to where it was before
Burdine. Some people may assert that Price Waterhouse only ap-
plies in a mixed motive case, that is in cases where both job per-
formance, a legitimate reason, and sex stereotyping, an illegitimate
reason, are factors. However, virtually all employment discrimina-
tion cases are mixed motive cases. In every case that I have tried,
the employer said it fired the person or did not promote them be-
cause there was someone else better qualified, usually a white
male. I say it was because of discrimination or reprisal. So you al-
ways have a mixed motive. If the burdens of proof are applied
properly now and in the future, these cases will be easier for plain-
tiffs to win.
Despite those positive developments, cases such as Patterson
give a clear message to people who advocate for civil rights that
the Rehnquist Supreme Court is not hospitable to civil rights
cases. That is what Justice Blackmun meant when he spoke of an
"ill-wind blowing" on the Supreme Court. As long as this trend is
recognized, it can produce some positive results. For one thing, I
think that Congress is going to react and, hopefully in 1990, we
will see remedial legislation. Senator Kennedy is the primary
leader of the cause to restore Title VII to what it was intended to
be before the Rehnquist Court started chipping away at employ-
ees' rights. The most important thing Congress can do is undo Pat-
terson. It should enact legislation to treat racial and sexual
harrassment on equal terms. But, apart from Patterson, there is
no good reason to be discouraged as a plaintiff's lawyer.
As always, plaintiff's counsel needs to know the rules and an-
ticipate developments in them. If you are not doing this, then you
are not doing as good a job as you ought to be doing as a plaintiffs'
employment trial lawyer. That is not to say that laws could not be
made more favorable to the plaintiff's side. But, until such
changes come about, I can live with those that we have been dealt,
and encourage you to do the same.
8. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).

